US-Russia missile race raises Europe’s nuke war risk

During July’s NATO summit, the United States and Germany reached an agreement for the US to start what it referred to as “episodic deployments” of missiles in 2026.

This will include Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6 ballistic missiles and a new generation of hypersonic systems currently under development. The main condition of the agreement is that none of these missiles will be equipped with nuclear warheads.

Russia responded by condemning the plan and hinting that it would consider deploying nuclear warheads to locations within range of Western Europe.

And according to the Financial Times, which has obtained a leak of classified Russian military domuments, Russia’s navy has been training to target sites across Europe as “far-flung as the west coast of France and Barrow-in-Furness in the UK.”

It’s an indication of how military tensions have been rising, even before the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Washington announced its agreement with Germany on July 10. It stated: “Exercising these advanced capabilities will demonstrate the United States’ commitment to NATO and its contributions to European integrated deterrence.”

It’s a strong signal to both Russia and NATO allies that the alliance is dramatically enhancing its already formidable conventional force capabilities in response to what it perceives as growing Russian militarism.

According to current NATO military doctrine, Russia’s defense strategy depends on using massive ballistic and cruise missile strikes to prevent NATO forces from coming within range of its forces. This concept is known as anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) and dates back to the early days of the Cold War, although the idea has been refined over the years.

At present NATO’s arsenal of air and sea-launched missiles is not capable of overcoming Russia’s A2/AD defenses as the longest-range missiles it has deployed in Europe are the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). These are already in use in Ukraine. They have a maximum range of 300 kilometers, which would be ineffective in an all-out conflict with Russia.

Accordingly, NATO’s military strategists agree on the need to deploy offensive long-range strike systems in Europe. NATO has an array of weapons available to it, with ranges of up to 3,000km.

They can be used both defensively and offensively to strike high-value targets deep inside Russia. Hypersonic missile classes now being developed can deliver their payloads at five times the speed of sound.

And, while most classes of NATO weapon systems are configured to carry conventional warheads, the BGM-109A Tomahawk Land Attack Missile has in the past carried a nuclear warhead. Other missiles could no doubt be modified to do the same.

At the moment, NATO has no ground-based missile systems in Europe capable of adequately deterring Russian offensive action against a NATO member in Europe. And Russia’s A2/AD systems are enough to prevent NATO from getting within striking range, hence the plan to station weapons systems with a much longer strike range.

The idea is that NATO’s enhanced ability to counter any aggressive Russian move will, in itself, act as a deterrent.

Spiraling arms race

Predictably, Vladimir Putin reacted by conjuring up a renewed “missile crisis.” He warned that if the US put missiles in Germany that were able to strike targets in Russia “in about ten minutes”, Russia would do the same. But he went further, declaring that as NATO weapons “in the future may be equipped with nuclear warheads”, Russia would have to “take mirror measures to deploy.”

The 1987 INF treaty, signed between then US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, banned missiles, nuclear and conventional, with ranges of between 500km and 5,500km. Donald Trump pulled the US out of the treaty in 2019, citing evidence of Russian non-compliance. Putin denied Russia had deployed treaty-busting weapons, but said Russia would no longer be bound by the treaty obligations either.

This gave rise to fresh fears of an arms race in Europe between a newly aggressive Russia and a more divided Western alliance. At present there is a considerable disparity in medium-range weapons that significantly favors Russia.

And, despite some strong opposition – particularly from inside Germany where the chairman of the ruling SPD party, Rolf Mützenich, said the decision posed a severe risk of arms escalation – Russian aggression has focused the minds of European governments on the imbalance in strategic strike capabilities in Europe.

Initially, the focus was on enhancing defensive capabilities. The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) was proposed in 2022 by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and signed in October 2023 by ten NATO allies.

ESSI involves a scheme to jointly procure integrated air-defense systems that can be operated in tandem. The initiative has since extended to cover 21 countries – including the traditionally neutral Switzerland.

But at the July NATO summit, France, Germany, Italy and Poland went further, signing the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA). This aims to enable the development, production and supply of European long-range strike capabilities to complement the US-German agreement.

Taken with the general increases across the board in NATO members’ defense budgets, July’s NATO summit showed the extent to which Russia’s recent aggression in Ukraine and its transition to a war economy has completely transformed the focus of NATO.

According to the influential US think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the alliance’s motto needs to change. It currently reads, in Latin: “Animus in consulendo liber” (in discussion a free mind). More apt, says the CSIS, would be the phrase: “Si vis pacem, para bellum” (If you want peace, prepare for war).

While there is now wide agreement that NATO needs to field the forces to deter war, it is hoped that this will provide the basis for a more constructive engagement with Russia in the future.

Christoph Bluth is Professor of International Relations and Security, University of Bradford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.