The US Space Force (USSF) is gearing up for future wars of attrition in outer space, a strategic shift from putting capabilities in orbit to building the architectures to defend space-based systems and assets against adversary attacks.
The USSF’s expanded mission statement, issued in September, aims to “secure our nation’s interests in, from and to space,” and marks a significant shift for the service, according to USSF Chief of Space Operations General Bradley Saltzman, as quoted by National Defense Magazine this month.
“We weren’t thinking about combat attrition. Now, we have to shift to an architecture that’s going to have to stand up to an adversary that’s committed to denying us those capabilities,” Saltzman said in the report while referring to China as the USSF’s “pacing challenge.”
He said the USFF must now respond to China in space by both protecting US space-based assets while also denying the “very exquisite” kill web that China has put into orbit and is space-enabled. Saltzman expressed concerns about how fast China has assembled its space-based “threat array” and the variety of systems that make up the arsenal.
He notes in particularly frequency-jamming capacities, directed energy weapons and anti-satellite missiles. At the same time, Saltzman said he was “really proud” of the USFF’s shift toward “more resilient architectures”, noting in particular the Space Development Agency’s launch this year of Tranche 0 of its low Earth orbit (LEO) Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture.
Saltzman referred to Tranche O as “the tech pathfinder to reduce tech readiness levels and mature the technology” and “build assembly lines to put hundreds of satellites on orbit to do both data transport and missile warning.” He said the tech was a “big shift” in terms of process, timelines and capability.”
The National Defense Magazine report notes that the Ukraine war has proven that LEO constellations such as Starlink are resilient against attack in a conflict scenario. The report mentions that the USSF invests heavily in no-fail missions like missile warning nuclear command and control (C2) and focuses on producing tactically responsive space.
However, the report says that the question is how to take advantage of LEO constellations in the context of the USSF’s new mission. It mentions that was demonstrated by the Victus Nox mission, which showed the USSF’s capabilities to launch a satellite within 24 hours of receiving a mission order.
While it is challenging to picture how a space war of attrition would transpire and play out, it would undoubtedly have profound strategic, political and military implications.
In a January 2022 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Henry Sokolsky mentions that a space war between the US and China would likely involve hunter-killer satellites, dual-use commercial capabilities, ground-based electronic jammers, and cyber weapons and lasers designed to disable satellites without producing space debris.
The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) stated in an August 2021 report that China has tested and proven counter-space capabilities that threaten US and allied partners’ satellites and national security.
Although the USSF is looking into the possibility of attrition in space, it faces challenges regarding doctrine, organization, training and personnel, funding and facilities in building the capabilities necessary to fight such a space war.
The USSF published its doctrine in June 2020 outlining US space power’s guiding principles. It states that the US seeks a peaceful, secure, stable and accessible space domain, enabling freedom of action in other warfighting domains and contributing to international security.
It also says that US space forces protect, defend and project space power with close collaboration between the US, allies and partners. The doctrine describes space operations as global and multi-domain, requiring deliberate and synchronized defensive operations across all segments. It also stresses that the USSF values agility, innovation, and boldness, empowering small teams and prioritizing risk-taking opportunities for rapid learning and adaptation.
However, in the 2021 book War and Peace in Outer Space, Peter Hays points out that USSF doctrine is neither offensive nor strategic nor independent. Hays notes that the USSF may be force-fitting space doctrine into air doctrine despite the different operational characteristics of air and space domains.
Hayes mentions that the USSF must address fundamental questions about the operational characteristics of the space domain while being aware that few concepts in air or naval domains directly translate to the former.
He also suggests that the USSF borrow from limited or littoral perspectives on naval warfare instead of a global perspective, as the former two align more closely with the characteristics of current LEO space operations.
The USSF also faces the challenge of consolidating the US’ fragmented space organizations and stakeholders. A July 2016 report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that there were then 60 stakeholders involved in US space acquisitions, noting that fragmented leadership and lack of a single authority in the acquisition of space programs has led to challenges in acquiring, developing and deploying new space systems.
In response, the August 2023 Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force mentions that the USSF is in the process of preparing implementation plans to unify disparate acquisition and sustainment authorities for space systems currently distributed across the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), US Army, US Navy and several Office of the Secretary of Defense elements.
As for training and personnel challenges, Michael Spirtas and other writers mention in a 2020 RAND report that the USSF will likely need to draw about half of its general officers from the US Air Force or other services for the foreseeable future.
Spirtas and others also say that given the USSF’s small size, having personnel spend their entire careers there would be challenging. While many career fields would be organic to the USSF, many will be filled by US Air Force personnel on assignment, they say.
That could pose further challenges due to different organizational cultures between other armed service branches and the different levels of space-based expertise among personnel, which could affect the USSF’s institutional identity and operational readiness.
The USSF also faces significant funding challenges. In a 2022 Space Foundation white paper, Megan Wenrich and other writers say that since October 2022 the USSF has relied on “continuing resolutions,” which keep money flowing at 2021 levels with no provisions for new programs.
Wenrich and others warn that such short-term budget measures could harm USSF plans, endangering US national defense as tensions rise with China and Russia.
The US Department of Defense (DOD) notes that the USSF’s $30 billion budget request for fiscal year 2024 is about $3.9 billion over what was enacted for the service in fiscal 2023, with 60% of the USSF budget earmarked for research, development, testing and evaluation.
The January 2022 USSF Space Doctrine Note – Operations mentions that terrestrial facilities such as launch, C2, continuity of operations (COOP) sites and radar stations are critical for space operations. However, it notes several threats to terrestrial facilities, such as directed energy attacks, cyberattacks, electromagnetic pulses (EMP) and old-fashioned physical attacks.
Tyler Bates writes in a November 2022 article for Aether that as the USSF explores new mission areas such as in-space logistics, space-to-terrestrial energy distribution, cislunar space operations and global point-to-point rocket logistics by the 2030s, establishing the necessary infrastructure and defenses to support and secure these missions will be a significant challenge.