China’s growing appetite for a space fight with US

A new RAND report emphasizes China’s rising risk tolerance and growing strategic maneuvers in space, an aggressive push forged to challenge US dominance in the domain.

The RAND report examines open-source Chinese defense literature, providing a comprehensive overview of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives on space-based escalation over the past two decades.

It asserts that China’s leaders view the US as a dominant but declining power and anticipate aggressive future tactics, including the growing militarization of space.

The report says the PLA’s strategy encompasses both deterrence and coercion, a tactical mix that aims to force adversaries to bend to its political objectives or face a devastating space-based war.

The report outlines the PLA’s evolving views on space-based escalation. These views reflect a growing desire to assertively shape the fast-evolving strategic environment. Initially, the PLA’s strategic thinking was mainly theoretical, focusing on conflict prevention.

RAND mentions that the PLA changed its approach to space operations in 2013, focusing on military competition and controlled escalation to achieve political objectives.

It outlines a four-step escalation ladder involving demonstrating space strength, space military exercises, disposition of space forces and space strikes. The strategy aims to coerce opponents into submission while avoiding full-scale conflict.

The report says the shift toward higher risk tolerance in space is significantly influenced by the PLA’s view of the US as a declining power likely to resort to militarization. It also claims that Chinese President Xi Jinping’s influence has shaped the PLA’s increasing risk tolerance in space.  

RAND recommends that US officials should anticipate quick decision-making with little communication and not expect cooperation from the PLA in space crises. It says the US Space Force (USSF) should prepare for aggressive PLA actions in space even in peacetime.

China may flaunt its space strength by publicizing low-intensity tests of advanced space equipment, often in peacetime or early in a crisis, to demonstrate capability and resolve without engaging in conflict.

In May 2023, Asia Times reported that China’s mini spaceplane landed on an unspecified runway in the Gobi Desert after spending 276 days in orbit after its launch in August 2022.

China’s spaceplane possibly landed near the Lop Nur nuclear test site, which has previously been utilized for spaceplane recovery, or at the Dingxin Test and Training Base, where the PLA-Air Force (PLA-AF) regularly conducts large-scale exercises.

Chinese state media trumpeted the occasion as a noteworthy achievement in the nation’s space program.

In the same month, LeoLabs, a private space services company, reported that China’s mini spaceplane had engaged in multiple maneuvers and docking missions with a separate smaller object during its space mission.

In October 2021, the Financial Times (FT) reported that China launched a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that orbited the globe before heading towards its target.

FT reported that the test, which was not publicly announced and reportedly caught US intelligence off guard, demonstrated China’s significant progress in hypersonic technology. Reports indicated the missile missed its mark by “only” 38 kilometers.

The FT report said that hypersonic glide vehicles’ maneuverability and lower trajectory make them challenging to track and capable of evading US missile defense systems.

The hypersonic missile test coincided with heightened US-China tensions and China’s ongoing military activities near Taiwan.

While the US expressed concerns about China’s growing military capabilities, which it says contribute to regional and global instability, China portrayed the hypersonic missile test as a routine space vehicle test for spacecraft reusability.

China can also strategically pre-position its space forces for potential offensive operations. This approach includes launching and maneuvering space assets to create a sense of imminent threat, encouraging adversaries to reconsider their actions.

In an August 2023 Breaking Defense article, Sam Bresnick notes China’s accelerated space industry growth, with a notable increase in satellite launches over the past five years, has positioned it as the second-largest space power after the US.

Bresnick notes that the PLA has integrated these satellites into its military doctrine, enhancing navigation, surveillance, communication and missile warning systems capabilities.

He adds that China’s focus on satellite resilience – through proliferation, orbital diversification and rapid launch ability – has established a robust space architecture, potentially more resilient than the US’s.

He also highlights that China’s tactically responsive space launch (TRSL) capabilities have surpassed those of the US, emphasizing the need for the US to develop rapid launch capacity to maintain its strategic advantage in space.

At the last rung of China’s space escalation strategy is the potential to launch limited, targeted strikes on critical enemy space assets such as command and control nodes. Such actions would aim to coerce adversaries like the US into abandoning their objectives by showing both the capability and willingness to escalate.

In a June 2024 article for the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), David Chen mentions that China’s Shenlong spaceplane is capable of extended orbital presence and rapid redeployment, signaling strategic intent by maneuvering and deploying payloads such as rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO)-capable microsatellites.

Chen notes that China’s RPO operations in missions from 2020 to 2023 enable it to perform offensive maneuvers against adversary satellites, with these capabilities used to disable or capture enemy satellites.

He adds that cyber-electronic warfare is another critical aspect, with China developing systems to jam and hack enemy communications and GPS satellites. Chen adds that these efforts, combined with the potential deployment of directed energy weapons, represent a multifaceted threat to space-based command and control nodes, positioning China as a formidable adversary in space warfare​.

In assessing China’s growing space capabilities, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank says in its Space Threat Assessment 2024 that China considers its space and counter-space capabilities critical to its national security strategy.

It notes that this emphasis is driven by China’s intention to utilize counter-space systems to deter and counter foreign involvement in regional conflicts, such as the potential for a war with the US in the Taiwan Strait.