The US Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program’s skyrocketing costs threaten the crucial weapon’s future just as the US faces growing nuclear competition from China and Russia.
This month, the US Air Force’s (USAF) Sentinel ICBM program, managed by Northrop Grumman, has seen its cost estimate soar to approximately US$160 billion, up from $95.8 billion, Reuters reported. The report asserts that soaring costs since 2020 may necessitate reducing the project’s scope or timeline.
The Sentinel program aims to replace aging Minuteman III missiles, ensuring the continuation of land-based US nuclear deterrent capabilities. However, the Reuters report notes that the latest cost escalation has triggered the Nunn-McCurdy Act, necessitating a formal justification to the US Congress for the program’s increased expenditure.
Nevertheless, Reuters says that the US Department of Defense (DOD) is expected to provide a new cost estimate soon, with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin likely to address the US Congress next week. The report adds that rising costs are exerting pressure on other USAF programs as well.
The Reuters report says the DOD is considering modifications to Sentinel’s construction and schedule to manage expenses. It mentions that the USAF has previously acknowledged a cost rise to “at least” $131 billion in January, which already exceeded the Nunn-McCurdy threshold.
A three-way nuclear arms race between the US, China and Russia is already underway, with the US struggling to expand its arsenal in response to its rivals’ nuclear rearmament and threats.
In June 2024, The New York Times reported that amidst the growing nuclear capabilities of China and Russia, a senior Biden administration official, Pranay Vaddi, indicated the US may need to expand its nuclear arsenal, reversing decades of reduction efforts.
The same report says that this stance, revealed at the Arms Control Association’s annual meeting, comes as China aims to match US and Russian nuclear weapon numbers by 2035 and Russia threatens nuclear weapon use in Ukraine and space.
The New York Times report mentions that the US seeks to modernize its arsenal, exemplified by the development of the B61-13 gravity bomb, but expansion is on the table if adversaries’ trajectories don’t change.
It also says the US remains open to arms control agreements, but with dim prospects for new pacts, it is also preparing for a world of nuclear competition without numerical constraints.
The New York Times says the US hopes to use its modernized arsenal to incentivize Russia and China to return to arms control negotiations, aiming to manage rivalry through diplomacy rather than unrestrained competition.
However, it points out that with no talks on replacing the New START agreement and China’s disinterest in arms control until its arsenal is significantly expanded, the US faces challenges in steering the nuclear future toward stability.
China and Russia’s nuclear developments are clearly of concern to US defense planners, with China’s expanding nuclear arsenal, Russia’s nuclear threats in the Ukraine war and burgeoning China-Russia nuclear cooperation putting the US on a back foot in what appears to be shaping into a renewed nuclear arms race.
In the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 2024 Yearbook, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda mention that, as of January 2024, China’s nuclear arsenal has seen a significant expansion, with an estimated total stockpile of about 500 nuclear warheads.
Kristensen and Korda note this is an increase from the previous year and 90 more than SIPRI’s estimate from 2023. They assert the stockpile growth is part of China’s broader nuclear modernization and expansion, which includes the development of land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and nuclear-configured aircraft.
Kristensen and Korda also note that China’s modernization efforts signal a change in its nuclear posture, potentially indicating that some warheads are now combined with their delivery systems, marking an important shift from China’s previous policy of keeping warheads separate during peacetime.
They also note that the US DOD says China’s nuclear arsenal could potentially double by 2030, though this forecast relies on speculation about China’s future military stance and plutonium output.
Kristensen and Korda note that even though China’s nuclear arsenal has become more advanced and larger, there is no public evidence that the Chinese government has changed its fundamental nuclear policies, including its “no-first-use” policy.
Kristensen and Korda also mention that, as of January 2024, Russia maintained a formidable nuclear arsenal with an estimated 4,380 warheads. They say that Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, comprising aircraft, land-based missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), account for approximately 2,822 warheads.
However, they point out that Russia has seen a net decrease of around 109 warheads compared to the previous year, despite an increase in strategic warheads due to the deployment of new ICBMs and a new nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
They also mention that Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces, designed to offset perceived conventional inferiority vis-a-vis NATO forces, are estimated to have nearly 1,560 warheads.
Kristensen and Korda say that in contrast to China’s “no-first-use” nuclear policy, Russia’s nuclear strategy, highlighted by its deterrence policy, outlines explicit conditions for launching nuclear weapons, including in response to attacks on Russian territory or allies.
Moreover, Asia Times reported in March 2023 that Russia had announced plans to provide China with advanced nuclear reactor technology, potentially enabling a substantial increase in China’s nuclear warhead production.
In December 2022, China received 25 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia’s state nuclear agency, Rosatom, for its CFR-600 fast breeder reactor. US defense officials project the uranium transfer could allow China to expand its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads by 2035.
While China maintains that the CFR-600 is tied strictly to its civilian nuclear power ambitions, the US views it as a stepping stone for military nuclear capabilities.
In contrast, Asia Times reported in January 2024 that the US faces challenges in modernizing its nuclear arsenal due to issues with its warheads. The US cannot use plutonium from decommissioned warheads in new ones due to microscopic changes that can affect storage safety and explosive yield.
Existing US plutonium nuclear pits, designed for older weapons, may not perform as expected in newer weapons. The US aims to produce 80 plutonium pits by 2026 to modernize its nuclear arsenal but current production capacity means it won’t reach this goal until 2030 or possibly even 2040.
This shortfall is attributed to post-Cold War complacency, a lack of skilled nuclear workers, declining industrial infrastructure and restrictive environmental regulations.
Despite these challenges, the US National Nuclear Security Administration (US NNSA) plans to build 50 new pits yearly at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and 30 at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
However, these efforts are reportedly behind schedule, highlighting the difficulties in restarting US pit production.
None of this had to happen. The USA deliberately chose Russia and China as enemies, the former simply because it needed an enemy to keep NATO relevant, and the latter because it cannot compete with it economically without employing the usual ‘playing-field levelers’ of sanctions and tariffs. It abused its power while it remained, and now it will lose it.