Harris has decidedly different view on Gaza than Biden

Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington has placed the political spotlight on divisions within the Democratic Party over the war in Gaza.

After Joe Biden’s withdrawal from the presidential race, the presumptive Democratic nominee, Kamala Harris, inherits a politically thorny issue. It’s an issue that has plagued the president since the Hamas attacks in October 2023.

Harris will need to strike a difficult balance between explaining how she would chart a distinctive path on Israel and Palestine, while also defending the record of an administration in which she still serves.

The vice president’s record on the issue so far – and her decision not to preside over Netanyahu’s speech in Congress – have stoked hopes in progressive circles that she may adopt a tougher position towards Israel. Such a shift could be vital in convincing pro-Palestinian voters disillusioned with Biden to turn out for her in November.

Vice presidents tend to toe the party line on foreign affairs. But Harris has been unusually outspoken on US policy towards the Middle East. In December, for example, she delivered a speech in Dubai after meeting with leaders of several Arab states. In the speech she expressed concern about the scale of civilian suffering in Gaza.

She did reaffirm the Biden administration’s position regarding Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas. But she also insisted that “international humanitarian law must be respected,” implying that Israel’s conduct risked falling short of that standard. “As Israel defends itself, it matters how,” she said.

In March, Harris was the first senior administration official to call for an “immediate ceasefire.” She was again sharp in her criticism of the Israeli government’s handling of the humanitarian dimensions of its war, which had led to “inhumane conditions” in Gaza.

In remarks that were strong enough to prompt National Security Council officials to intervene and tone them down, Harris declared: “Our common humanity compels us to act.” She called for Netanyahu’s government to “do more to significantly increase the flow of aid. No excuses.”

Realistically, conventional political wisdom in the US suggests that Harris faces an uphill task in translating whatever daylight exists between her and Biden into electoral success in November. The US public is said to know little, and care less, about international affairs. So, when most people enter polling booths, it is kitchen-table issues – inflation, interest rates and immigration – that determine who wins their vote.

In fact, the proportion of Americans who rank any foreign policy issue as the most important problem facing the country averages around 10%-20%. Around three times more voters are primarily concerned with economic issues.

The pro-Palestinian protests on college campuses earlier this year and the demonstrations in Washington this week may therefore exaggerate the importance of an issue that animates only a vocal minority.

Leadership qualities

But recent research suggests that these stats may give a misleading impression of the way in which individuals assess political candidates. In practice, voters tend to care less about specific issues than whether a candidate has the right personal attributes to be an effective commander-in-chief.

Harris’s comments about the war may help her project a broader image as a leader who is prepared to stand up for certain values on the world stage, such as the importance of upholding international law and protecting human rights. This would be a marked contrast with the position of Donald Trump.

Trump called on Biden during their now infamous 2024 debate in June to let Israel “finish the job” without further restrictions from Washington, displaying few qualms about the way in which Israel prosecuted its war with Hamas.

This is important because we know that foreign policy may not feature heavily in polling, but has been shown to affect elections if voters are presented with a clear choice between candidates.

Harris’s and Trump’s positions on Israel illustrate that the choice in 2024 is between a candidate who is committed to defending the rules-based international order and one who has a track record of undermining it.

There is also a simple mathematical reason why this might matter in November. The outcome of this year’s presidential election is likely to come down to fine margins in a handful of states.

These include Michigan, where more than 100,000 young voters and Arab Americans demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s handling of the war in Gaza by casting “uncommitted” ballots in the state’s Democratic primary in February. This in a state that Trump won in 2016 by just 11,000 votes (but lost in 2020).

Even if foreign policy shifts few votes on a national scale, the position Harris takes on Gaza could be enough to tip the scale in these must-win races.

Where does this leave Joe Biden?

Assuming he does not bow to pressure from Republican critics calling for his resignation, Biden will still serve as commander-in-chief for another six months. As I have argued in a recent book, presidents in the twilight of their term must still pay attention to the political calendar when making decisions about war and peace.

Like many of his predecessors, Biden is likely to turn to foreign policy as a means of cementing his legacy. A ceasefire agreement in Gaza could be a promising scenario. If the administration were able to broker a deal between Israel and Hamas before the election, it would also help Harris by reducing the salience of a sensitive political issue.

Having stepped aside in favor of his vice president, Biden (belatedly) aims to become the transitional president he once promised to be. On Israel, he may indeed be the last of his kind.

Harris could yet be the bridge between Biden’s generation of Democratic leaders who share a deep personal bond with the state of Israel, and a younger group of progressives who are much more willing to criticize the policies of the Israeli government.

Andrew Payne is a lecturer in foreign policy and security at City, University of London.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.