Second Thomas Shoal isn’t worth war with China

Tensions have eased slightly in the South China Sea as Manila and Beijing appear to have come to an agreement on the humanitarian delivery of supplies to the Philippines’ beleaguered outpost, the rusting and rapidly deteriorating remains of a WWII-era warship that was intentionally grounded on Second Thomas Shoal.

To be sure, this new development in the long-running maritime dispute is encouraging. But another crisis could unfortunately be just around the corner as both parties are already arguing about what exactly has been agreed.

In June, Chinese Coast Guard personnel assaulted and took control of a small Philippine vessel that was approaching Second Thomas Shoal.  Some commentators even called for the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty to be invoked. 

With the tenuous situation in Ukraine, ominous signs in the Taiwan Strait, and a tumultuous US election season in full swing, Washington is no doubt loathe to exhibit any hint of weakness.

The US Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense made simultaneous visits to Manila recently, bringing with them a US$500 million aid package and a proposal for enhanced intelligence sharing.

There certainly has been no shortage of US military activity in and around the Philippines in 2024. For example, the US Marine Corps recently flew missions from Luzon with its new F-35B, and the US Army first deployed (albeit temporarily) its first Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile to the Philippines as well just a couple of months earlier.

Observing such tendencies, it’s worth asking whether or not risking an armed clash with China in the South China Sea genuinely serves US national interests. Many in Washington evince grave concern over “Chinese expansion” and “Beijing’s aggression,” yet such attitudes do not actually conform to the facts of the case.

It is true that China has built up reef bases in the South China Sea – moving lots of sand and concrete around in the process and ruffling a lot of feathers inside and outside the region during that process.

Nevertheless, it is rarely noted that China has deliberately chosen not to fully exploit that new position “on the chessboard” by placing combat-ready air wings at the extensive new bases. 

Likewise, the choice of resorting frequently to water cannon by the Chinese Coast Guard is not accidental. It’s a conscious choice to pursue Beijing’s objectives without resorting to lethal force – another clear sign of restraint.

Looking at the situation within a larger picture, moreover, one sees that China is not actually blocking or hindering international trade in these crucial sea lanes, nor has it resorted to the large-scale use of force in more than four decades – a remarkable record for a rising great power.

So, what exactly is China’s game in the South China Sea? Unquestionably, Beijing seeks to protect its own fishing and drilling prerogatives. Still more important are the strategic imperatives to safeguard China’s trading routes, as well as the relatively new basing of the Chinese Navy’s nuclear missile submarines.

Nevertheless, China’s primary motive has been neglected by almost all reporting on the South China Sea issue, regrettably.

A glance at a map reveals that the Philippines is extremely proximate to the sensitive Taiwan Strait. New US basing in its former colony would grant Washington a significantly improved position in the context of a conflict over Taiwan between China and America.

Yet, Manila politics can be quite topsy-turvy and the Philippines Constitution actually forbids foreign basing in the country – a fact little understood by Americans. Given the rather delicate history between Washington and Manila, the basing position is far from secure.

Therefore, the US has been working overtime to secure its “new” foothold in the archipelago by making upgrades to facilities at six different sites, including on Luzon, the island closest to Taiwan.

There are real problems with trying to defend Taiwan, especially considering that China has achieved conventional superiority in the surrounding area and there are considerable nuclear risks too. 

Yet, this ultra-dangerous problem at the heart of the contemporary US-China military rivalry seems to be also destabilizing the South China Sea situation now too, as Beijing seeks to demonstrate its displeasure with Manila’s permitting new basing positions to Washington just south of Taiwan.

It is not coincidental that the Philippines’ position at Second Thomas Shoal became a “hot potato” at precisely the same time at which the US started getting much more serious about improving its basing on the northern flank of the Philippine archipelago.

Make no mistake, the US should act to defend the Philippines if that proves necessary. There is a long-running alliance treaty relationship that reflects the very deep cultural-historical relationship that goes back over a century.

On the other hand, Washington should not embark lightly on risking war with another nuclear power. Common sense dictates that the US should completely rule out any notion of going to war with China over a contested shoal or some angry fishermen.

The hard truth that American strategists need to finally come to grips with is that the South China Sea is increasingly “China’s Caribbean.” As is well known, the US brooks no external great power intervention in the Caribbean, as proscribed in the Monroe Doctrine.

Washington has always done what it needs to do in this sensitive area for US national security, even if that meant regular military interventions to the point of carving up the country of Colombia in order to build the strategically vital Panama Canal.

In that respect, Beijing has been considerably less aggressive than Uncle Sam was in his rambunctious adolescence.

Lyle Goldstein is the Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities.