South Korea’s interest in developing nuclear weapons can be traced back to the 1970s, during the tenure of President Park Chung-hee.
This period was marked by heightened regional tensions and a growing sense of insecurity, particularly in light of North Korea’s increasing interest in nuclear weapons and its escalating military capabilities.
Additionally, there was a prevailing sentiment among South Koreans of growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of the United States’ security guarantees amid the rapidly changing geopolitical situation at the time.
These factors, along with various domestic political considerations, collectively spurred the South Korean leadership to initiate a covert nuclear weapons program aimed at bolstering the nation’s defense capabilities.
The clandestine nature of this program underscored the sensitive geopolitical dynamics of the era, as South Korea sought to address its security concerns independently of its alliance partners in the region.
However, the United States, a key ally and strategic partner, was not willing to allow South Korea to challenge the nuclear regime established by the five recognized nuclear powers or disrupt the nuclear balance of power in the region.
Consequently, the US exerted considerable diplomatic and political pressure on South Korea to restrain its nuclear ambitions. As a result, by the late 1970s, South Korea agreed to terminate its nuclear weapons program and remain within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since then, South Korea has adhered to its commitment as a non-nuclear-weapons state under the NPT, which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
However, in recent years, with North Korea successfully acquiring nuclear weapons and the fast-evolving geopolitical environment in the region — marked by the alignment of Russia, China, and North Korea to challenge the US-led strategic architecture — there has been a renewed discourse within South Korea regarding the potential reconsideration of its nuclear options.
This contemporary debate among South Koreans reflects ongoing security concerns and strategic calculations in response to regional threats.
New drivers for South Korean nukes
The debate over whether South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons is complex and multi-dimensional, driven by an evolving geopolitical landscape, increasing threats from North Korea and challenges posed by an assertive China.
For some time, South Korea has grappled with the question of pursuing nuclear armament to restore the balance of power in the region. Now the urgency of this decision is becoming more apparent, as postponement may no longer be a viable option for South Korea amid the rapidly developing security dynamics of the peninsula and the wider region.
South Korea has thus far adhered to its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and relied on its alliance with the United States, refraining from developing nuclear weapons despite having the necessary know-how and technical expertise.
However, concerns about the effectiveness of the NPT in curbing nuclear proliferation worldwide, combined with uncertainties surrounding the US-South Korea alliance — exacerbated by trade tensions, discussions about potential reductions in US military support and demands that Seoul pay more for US forces stationed in the country — are intensifying the debate on the next best course of action for South Korea.
Many in South Korea feel that an independent nuclear capability could provide the country with greater autonomy in its defense strategy, reducing its reliance on the US for security.
Despite US pressure and harsh sanctions by the international community, Pyongyang’s nuclear program has progressed far beyond its early stages, establishing North Korea as a significant nuclear power with a substantial arsenal. Despite various forms of pressure, North Korea has continued to expand its nuclear capabilities, potentially threatening South Korea and even the US mainland.
As North Korea’s arsenal grows, doubts about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella have resurfaced, with many in South Korea questioning whether the US would defend South Korea, especially when Washington is preoccupied with more urgent issues in other parts of the world such as Ukraine and the Middle East.
Many South Koreans have begun to believe that acquiring nuclear weapons could offer the country strategic leverage in its dealings with North Korea and other regional actors. By signaling a potential willingness to develop nuclear weapons, South Korea might encourage North Korea and its allies, including China, to engage more constructively in negotiations. This strategy could help halt North Korea’s nuclear advancements and foster more effective denuclearization discussions.
The recent strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia, which includes mutual defense agreements, complicates the regional security landscape. This alliance could further entrench North Korea’s nuclear status, prompting South Korea to explore a broader range of security options, potentially including the development of its own nuclear deterrent.
Public opinion in South Korea has shifted notably, with increasing support for a domestic nuclear capability. Polls indicate that a significant portion of the population favors this idea, driven by concerns about North Korea’s nuclear threats and skepticism about the reliability of US protection. This shift in public sentiment may reflect a growing national inclination toward considering nuclear armament as a defensive measure.
The possible return of Donald Trump to the US presidency has rekindled discussions about South Korea’s nuclear options. During his first presidential campaign in 2016, Trump suggested that South Korea, as well as Japan, might consider developing indigenous nuclear weapons to defend against North Korea and reduce reliance on the United States for security.
During his previous term, Trump’s unconventional foreign policy, particularly toward North Korea, raised concerns about US defense commitments. His direct engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and decisions like suspending joint military exercises with South Korea in 2018 alarmed many in Seoul, as these exercises are vital for maintaining readiness against potential aggression.
If re-elected, Trump might continue to prioritize direct engagement with North Korea, potentially at the expense of traditional deterrence strategies. This could include scaling back the US military presence in South Korea unless Seoul significantly increases its financial contributions.
However, while developing nuclear weapons could enhance South Korea’s deterrence against North Korea, it also poses significant risks, including diplomatic and economic isolation. Such a move could provoke strong reactions from neighboring countries, particularly China and North Korea, and potentially trigger a regional arms race.
Japan, for instance, might feel compelled to develop its own nuclear arsenal, fundamentally altering the security dynamics in East Asia.
Furthermore, South Korea’s nuclearization would violate the NPT, likely resulting in international condemnation and potential economic sanctions. The United States, along with its regional allies, might also impose sanctions if South Korea proceeds without proper coordination, despite their alliance.
Parallels with India’s nuclear program
The decision to pursue nuclear weapons involves weighing substantial costs and international implications against the need for a reliable deterrent against North Korea, enhanced national security and strategic benefits.
As South Korea navigates this complex issue, it finds parallels in India’s nuclear journey. India’s nuclear program was driven by security concerns, the desire for strategic autonomy, and the aspiration to enhance its international standing. India sought to counterbalance the nuclear capabilities of China and Pakistan and establish itself as a regional power.
Similarly, South Korea has relied on the US nuclear umbrella to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat. However, the persistent and escalating threats from North Korea have increased domestic support for an independent nuclear deterrent. South Korea seeks greater control over its national security, reducing dependence on the United States amid doubts about the credibility and sustainability of US extended deterrence.
While developing its nuclear weapons, India faced many of the same problems and hardships that South Korea is encountering today. Thus, India’s experience offers valuable lessons for South Korea.
Despite facing international backlash and sanctions following its nuclear tests in 1998, India managed to secure strategic partnerships with major powers, including the United States. This suggests that the long-term benefits of nuclear deterrence can outweigh the short-term diplomatic and economic costs, providing a potential roadmap for South Korea.
As South Korea considers its nuclear future, there are several ways India could assist. India could offer diplomatic support, share its experiences in managing international sanctions, and help establish post-nuclearization partnerships. Both nations could benefit from cooperation in nuclear safety, civilian nuclear energy, and related fields. A collaborative approach on nuclear issues could enhance regional stability and security, balancing China’s influence and addressing the North Korean threat.
As strategic partners, India and South Korea can navigate potential international backlash and sanctions, potentially affecting their economies and global standing.
Indian support for South Korea’s nuclear program could be seen as a strategic measure to counteract the increasing nuclear capabilities of North Korea and its strategic partnership with Russia. By supporting South Korea, India can contribute to a more balanced power structure in Asia and help create a stable and secure regional environment, reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.
India’s support for South Korea’s nuclear program would represent a strategic decision that could enhance regional security, balance geopolitical power in Asia, and strengthen bilateral relations. Drawing from its nuclear history, India can provide South Korea with valuable guidance and support, contributing to a more stable and secure Asian continent.
Lakhvinder Singh is the director of peace and security studies at the Asia Institute in Seoul.