Philippine BrahMos missile base drops a sea gauntlet on China

The Philippines’ construction of its first BrahMos anti-ship missile base highlights a bold military modernization move amid rising tensions with China in the South China Sea.

However, the move’s success is imperiled by inadequate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and air defense capabilities, potential logistical challenges and the complexities of regional geopolitics.

This month, Naval News reported that the Philippines is constructing its first BrahMos anti-ship missile base at the Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui in Zambales, Western Luzon. Naval News says that the base, which faces the contested South China Sea, is set to house the supersonic cruise missiles acquired from India in a landmark US$375 million deal in 2022.

The report notes that the Philippines’ procurement of three BrahMos missile batteries marked the first international sale of India’s highly regarded system, sparking interest from other regional nations including Vietnam and Indonesia – both of which also have South China Sea disputes with China.

Satellite imagery has revealed the new missile base includes a high-bay facility for missile maintenance and assembly and a sheltered magazine bunker for storage. The Philippine Marine Corps Coastal Defense Regiment will operate the base, which is strategically positioned to strike targets up to 290-300 kilometers away, including the disputed Scarborough Shoal occupied by China.

The Naval News report adds that the BrahMos system’s mobile nature allows for flexible deployment to various firing locations, enhancing the country’s coastal defense capabilities.

The report says the Philippines may soon make follow-up orders for the BrahMos as the Philippine Army has expressed interest in procuring the system, indicating a possible broader adoption of advanced military technology across the Philippine armed forces.

While the Philippines’ BrahMos acquisition is a significant step in modernizing its military, it may be much less impactful than its military planners and local pundits hope and tout.

To shoot far, the Philippines needs to see far. Without long-range ISR capabilities, the Philippines may not be able to use the full range of the BrahMos missile; it may be limited to the range of its available ISR assets, which are measured in just dozens of kilometers.

The country does not have over-the-horizon (OTH) radar, although that may be understandable given that such capability is usually limited to major military powers.

Although the Philippines has some Hermes and ScanEagle drones, they are few in number, slow and vulnerable to sophisticated Chinese anti-air defenses.

While the US may help to improve the Philippines’ deficient ISR capabilities, seen in the use of its MQ-9A Reaper drone to support a sinking exercise (SINKEX) last month involving the Philippines’ BRP Jose Rizal frigate sinking a decommissioned Chinese-made oil tanker, those drones may also fare poorly against China’s air defenses considering they were unable to survive even rudimentary air defenses by Houthi rebels in Yemen.

The Philippines also does not operate dedicated airborne warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, having only a motley fleet of Beechcraft King Air C-90, BN-2A Islander and Cessna 208 planes. Compared to aircraft such as the E-7 Sentry or P-8 Poseidon, these planes are barely capable of maritime ISR tasks.

However, as Scarborough Shoal is a fixed target whose location is always known, the Philippines may not need sophisticated ISR capabilities to use its Brahmos missiles. The contested and strategic feature could be easily targeted, enabling the Philippines to threaten a small but significant part of China’s revised “10-dash line” in the South China Sea.

But even if the Philippines had all these ISR assets and aimed its BrahMos missiles at an easy target like Scarborough Shoal, Command and Control (C2) is also a significant challenge for its military, raising questions about how it would integrate these disparate assets into an effective kill chain.

Defending its new BrahMos missile base from missile and drone attacks may also be challenging for the Philippines, which has long struggled to build credible air defense capabilities. 

Since the 1990s, the Philippines has failed to acquire multi-role fighters (MRF) and now relies on only a small fleet of a dozen FA-50 light fighters. Those planes possess only a fraction of the capabilities of more advanced aircraft such as the US-made F-16 and Sweden’s JAS 39 Gripen.

While the Philippines operates two batteries of Israel-made SPYDER surface-to-air missiles (SAM), it will have to decide whether to allocate those limited assets to defending critical infrastructure and densely populated areas over military sites such as its new BrahMos base.

In the event of a protracted conflict in the South China Sea, restocking BrahMos missiles may also be a problem for the Philippines due to its limited stockpiles.

The Philippines is not capable of manufacturing BrahMos missiles, forcing it to rely on India for resupply. China could conceivably try to enforce a naval blockade of the Philippines in the South China Sea and another in the Philippine Sea that could cut US resupply and reinforcement from Guam.

While the Philippines seeks to leverage “extended deterrence” guarantees from the US by hoping that an attack on its BrahMos base would trigger their longstanding 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), such hopes may be overly optimistic.

Asia Times pointed out in a May 2024 article that despite strong rhetoric from US officials emphasizing the “ironclad” nature of the Philippines-US alliance, the 1975 US interpretation of the 1951 MDT excludes Scarborough Shoal from US treaty obligations. Lopsided US interpretations of the 1951 MDT may imply that Scarborough Shoal is of marginal value to US interests and not worth a major conflict with China.

Similarly, in a December 2023 HK 101 article, Zheng Zhen writes that while tensions with the Philippines are certainly on China’s agenda, they are not Beijing’s main concern in the South China Sea, which it views as a conflict mainly with the US. Zhen adds that China’s main challenge with the Philippines is dissuading it from trying to pull the US into helping it reinforce its territorial claims.

Li Mingjiang and Xing Jiaying mention in an article this month for Carnegie China that some Chinese officials believe China’s “gray zone” approach is the best way to address tensions with the Philippines. They say such tactics will help avoid the worst-case scenario of an outright military conflict while simultaneously advancing China’s territorial claims.

However, Li and Xing note in a case scenario where the Philippines opts to use military force or pull in the US and its allies to counter China’s actions, Beijing could respond with overwhelming military force, justifying its response as retaliation and self-defense.

They say this could lead to the Philippines losing even more of the features it claims in the South China Sea vis-a-vis China, including Scarborough Shoal.