Chinese leader Xi Jinping has done what no American president ever could. He got Japan to get serious about defense after decades of pathological overdependence on US forces.
But here’s the problem: Being serious about defense and actually being able to defend oneself are different things. Japan already has a large and powerful defense force – on paper at least. Its military power has been rated #7 in the world.
And in recent years Japan has undertaken to double defense spending, buy and develop long-range missiles, signed defense agreements with several foreign countries, is poised to establish a Joint Operations Command and is pushing the Americans to operationalize their US Forces Japan headquarters.
And the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) is doing more and increasingly complex exercises with the Americans, the Australians and others.
That’s the good news. But here’s the not-so-good news: the JSDF still isn’t a real fighting force. It’s not prepared to fight a war in terms of organization, logistics, command and control, hardware and weaponry, combat-casualty replacement, reserve forces, or even psychologically.
It has some good niche capabilities, particularly in the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF). Submarines, anti-submarine warfare, maritime and aerial surveillance, mine warfare and naval surface combatants are all good – as are Japan’s space capabilities and missile defense.
But the JSDF’s inability to conduct joint operations – combining all three services – is a huge problem. Without this, the JSDF isn’t the sum of its parts. But they understand the problem and are finally trying to fix it. It will take time to get it right.
The quality of JSDF personnel is generally excellent but they suffer from decades of poor treatment in terms of pay and housing and benefits, and a general lack of respect from Japan’s political class and so-called elite classes.
The JSDF is about half the size it needs to be to cover the many missions it must handle. MSDF and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) in particular should be doubled in size.
The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) is about the right size (about 140,000) but needs to be totally revamped to become a warfighting outfit rather than something more like a National Guard.
Recruitment is a huge problem and has been for years. The JSDF typically misses targets by about 20% but last year missed by a whopping 50%. Yes, 50%.
The problem is partly the shrinking Japanese population, but even more, it’s the aforementioned poor terms of service and lack of respect for the JSDF. With some political leadership and support, there’s no reason JSDF can’t attract enough recruits rather than make excuses.
If you want to see how US forces and Japanese forces work well together operationally and in most other respects, go down to Yokosuka Naval and visit the US 7th Fleet and the Japanese Navy at nearby Funakoshi. This shows what can be done.
But aside from this bright spot, it’s a disgrace that US and Japanese forces still do not operate very well together – if at all.
Other than the two navies and missile defense, can they do real-world short-notice operations? No. Or at least not without huge efforts to jury rig some half-baked response.
Successive US commanders and civilian leaders – and “alliance managers” – in Japan, Hawaii, and Washington DC should be ashamed of themselves for having accomplished so little in 60 years when it comes to the two nations’ militaries being able to operate together.
The exceptions – and there are a number of them – know who they are.
The Japanese weren’t all that helpful either, and until about 10 years ago any Japanese officer who suggested a more useful operational alliance with US forces was going to have plenty of trouble – and likely be fired.
Japan’s political leadership and bureaucracy (including inside MOD) are largely to blame for slowing things down or even putting up barriers. And they often still do.
But isn’t Japan a pacifist country, legally preventing it from developing a “real” military? Japan is not a pacifist country. It’s got a real military – despite imperfections – and it’s glad to have the Americans exterminate any enemies for them.
As for the constitution that supposedly ties Japan’s hands, Tokyo has always done whatever it feels it must do. The constitution has been reinterpreted many times. Japanese diplomats and officials use the constitution as an excuse to avoid doing anything they don’t want to do. That works very well on the Americans.
Are things really this bad? Yes.
For instance, where is the joint Japan-US headquarters in Japan where US and Japanese officers sit together and conduct necessary operations and activities for the defense of Japan and surrounding areas? Answer: It doesn’t exist.
And after decades of US officials insisting the “relationship has never been stronger.” Once again, a disgrace.
But what about the Alliance Coordination Mechanism both nations created in 2015? That is not a “place”, rather it’s just an agreement to get together and “talk.” In other words, wing it if something happens, including if China attacks Taiwan.
Japan decided to double defense spending before the Japanese yen weakened precipitously. Double it now and you’ve not really doubled it.
An even bigger problem is that the Japanese really don’t know what to spend the extra money on. The US expects Japan to figure it out on its own.
Instead, it should send some good war planners to Japan and explain the practical requirements for fighting a war – and focus spending on these areas. Also, spend money on JSDF personnel so it’s a more attractive profession. People are as important as hardware.
So how will the Japan-US partnership progress from here? There is no reason Tokyo and Washington can’t turn the relationship into one where their combined resource and combat power can throw their weight around and make life difficult for any adversaries.
But that requires leadership, imagination, initiative and will on both sides – at top and mid-levels too. Unfortunately, Japan seems set for only incremental improvements – good in their own right but not fast enough or sufficient to really improve Japan-US combat power as needed to take on China, North Korea and Russia.
Clearly both sides finally want to do more but they also need a sense of urgency to steamroll bureaucratic obstacles and political lethargy. And there’s a feeling, not unfounded, on the US side that it’s overworked and can’t afford to do more.
Things are much better than they were a decade ago but aren’t close to where they need to be. There is much lost time to make up. Is there enough time? Maybe, maybe not. And Beijing has a say in the matter.
Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat with a long history in Japan-US security relations. He is the author of the book “When China Attacks: A Warning To America.”